


EXHIBIT #
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT



DEPONENT: MASAKI, Jinsaburo

I, MASAKI, Jinsaburo, make oath and say as follows:

I was formerly a General of the Imperial Japanese Army.

I was Vice Chief of the General Staff from January 1932 to June 19, 1933; a War Councillor for a short while; the Inspector General of training from January 1934 to July 16, 1935; a War Councillor again, and was then transferred to the First Reserve in March 1936.

When I became the Vice Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the General Staff was H.R.H. the Prince KAN-I. and the War Minister was Lieutenant General ARAKI, Sadao.

When I assumed this post, War Minister ARAKI explained to me the internal and external situations of Japan which existed at that time, the gist of which as far as I remember was as follows:

"The state of affairs of our country, both internal and external is quite alarming. There have already been many internal incidents, and our relation with the League of Nations is far from being satisfactory.

As for Manchuria, in spite of the non-expansion policy of the former cabinet, the situation has simply become more aggravated. Unless we do something to stop it now, there is every danger that it will develop into a regular war.


We must leave no stone unturned in the immediate saving of this complicated situation. In view of the extreme seriousness of the condition of Manchuria today, the possible minimum military action may not be unavoidable for the sake of restoring law and order in that district, but the action, if it should take place, must never exceed the scope of self-defense. In other words, since the object of action lies in securing our self-defense by restoring peace and order in Manchuria, the theatre of operation must be limited within the Four Eastern Provinces which are under Chang Hueliang's regime. This is the policy of our cabinet."

At the time when I assumed the post as Vice Chief of the General Staff, Premier INUKAI, while he has explained chiefly the financial plight and economic difficulties that Japan was experiencing at that time, he also made some remarks on the situation which were more or less similar to that of War Minister ARAKI. The Premier did not in any way suggest that he had any intention of petitioning to the

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When I assumed this post, War Minister ARAKI explained to me the internal and external situations of Japan which existed at that time, the gist of which as far as I remember was as follows:

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At the time when I assumed the post as Vice Chief of the General Staff, Premier INUKAI, while he has explained chiefly the financial plight and economic difficulties that Japan was experiencing at that time, he also made some remarks on the situation which were more or less similar to that of War Minister ARAKI. The Premier did not in any way suggest that he had any intention of petitioning to the

Throne for an Imperial Order, by virtue of which to withdraw all the troops from Manchuria, nor did I ever hear from anyone that Premier IWAKAI had any such intention. It would have been impossible for any one to withdraw the troops in the midst of their operation unless the hostilities showed some sign of settlement.

Furthermore, Premier IWAKAI as clever as he was, should have known quite well that His Majesty the Emperor, who was an ardent believer in the Constitution, would have never granted him an Imperial Order related to military operation without first having an advice from the General Staff Headquarters. I cannot altogether imagine that Premier IWAKAI should have harbored such an intention.

I reported to H.R.H. the Prince KAN-IN, Chief of the General Staff, what I had heard from the Premier and the War Minister respectively, and with his approval, I managed and conducted the matters in accordance with the line shown to me by War Minister ARAKI. While I was doing so, it was suddenly decided by the Ministry that troops be despatched immediately to Shanghai which were requested by navy authorities for the purpose of reinforcing the navy and to protect Japanese nationals there.

Bearing in mind what I had heard from the War Minister, I took every precaution to observe his principle so that the despatched troops would not exceed the scope of their primary object. Divisional Commander UEDA (T.N. Commander of the despatched troops) also followed closely this principle and endeavored to settle the situation without resorting to means of bloodshed. I remember he first made a proclamation requesting reconsideration by the opponent over their action. However, contrary to his expectation, the opponent increased their preparation for fighting and added to the difficulties. In fact, there were signs that an overall clash between Chinese and Japanese was inevitable. Under these circumstances, further reinforcement was decided from the point of view of strategic importance, but as soon as the advance corps of reinforcement made their first landing, the 19th Route Army began to retreat, and as it was driven beyond the expected line, attack was ceased. Thus hostilities ended in three days, with almost negligible casualties.

In due course, an agreement was signed to ensure the future safety. (I think that in making this agreement, a committee of powers through the good offices of the League of Nations participated.)

This agreement provided Japan the right of stationing certain parts of her troops there, but in view of War Minister ARAKI's principle, which was completely identical to ours, we decided to evacuate all the troops from China and I think the complete withdrawal was made within a month of signing the agreement.

The Jehol campaign was the task of the Kwantung Army through the provisions of the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol and because constant disturbances of law and order in and around Jehol it became necessary for the Japanese and Manchukuo forces to resort to military action based on the provisions of the protocol. It took place after the formal recognition of the State of Manchukuo, and as the precaution was taken throughout the campaign not to divert from the primary

principle of bringing about law and order the operation called for extreme difficulties. Nevertheless, efforts were made to limit the action within the line of the Great Wall, and observance of this fundamental policy was sternly requested of the troops in the front at the risk of suffering considerable operational inconveniences. There was an occasion when the troops advanced beyond this limit, but they were immediately ordered to return and further action was stopped at that. Then the hostilities were finally settled by the conclusion of the Tangku Agreement.

I believe that War Minister ARAKI was one of the persons who was most seriously worried about the Manchurian Incident. Because of this worry, he had made a firm determination to settle it, which finally led to the Tangku Agreement. No sooner had the Agreement been signed than he strove to settle the overall situation of Japan by adjusting foreign as well as domestic affairs.

He often told me in those days that he was devoting his efforts toward letting the people live up to the original teachings of Japan, enhancing by so doing the virtue of benevolence of His Majesty the Emperor among the people, and externally, toward improving aggravated international relations by realizing the already advocated International Peace Conference.

The opinion of War Minister ARAKI toward the League of Nations was quite clear. He fully explained his opinion at the cabinet meeting and induced the meeting to the decision that Japan would not withdraw from the League.

I was under the impression that the War Minister had been prepared with an opinion with which he hoped to persuade the League of Nations. It also seemed to me that the War Minister had had a firm belief of getting the complete understanding of powers over Japan's position if once restoration of law and order in Manchuria were attained.

War Minister ARAKI stressed importance on quality rather than on quantity of troops from the viewpoint of armament. He endeavored to recover the armament which had fallen behind since World War I up to the old standard that Japan had maintained at the time of the war. He was particularly concerned in promoting the character and moral standard of the commissioned officers.

War Minister ARAKI also exerted efforts to calm the minds of the young officers who, indignant at the current situation, had already caused considerable trouble. He did his best to develop the immaculate spirit of those officers without being distorted so that they might devote their unshattered attention to their duty. While devoting his wholehearted attention to this purpose, he also let his subordinates spare no time in teaching and guiding the younger officers, and so they began to show the sign of composure in due course, and at the occasion of the May 15 Incident, it turned out that no army commissioned officer participated in it.

Def. Doc. # 2134

MASAKI, Jinsaburo

Subscribed and sworn to before the under-signed officer
by the above-named MASAKI, Jinsaburo, at the War Ministry
Building, Tokyo, Japan, on this _____ day of August 1947.
